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PANEL 3: FREE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION 
MODERATOR: ERIC SEGALL  
PANELISTS: MIKE DORF AND EUGENE VOLOKH 
 
Professor Eric Segall: Our speakers for this lunch panel on freedom 
of speech and freedom of religion are Mike Dorf, again, from 
Cornell, and Eugene Volokh from UCLA Law School in Los 
Angeles. 
So, we’re going to talk about speech, and we’re going to talk about 
religion, and we’re going to talk about cases that intersect with 
speech and religion. But, let’s start with this: Jonathan Adler, who is 
over there, wrote when Justice Kennedy retired—I think others wrote 
this, but I think Jonathan wrote it best—that Justice Kennedy was our 
most speech-protective Justice I guess in history, I think is what you 
said. Is that true? And if so, why do you think that was? 
Professor Michael Dorf: I’ll start on whether it’s true.  
Yes, but I would add the qualification, except in cases involving 
students and the government as proprietors or employee speech 
cases. 
If you think about the great free speech champions of Supreme 
Court history, you have the later Holmes, Brandeis, then you have to 
go way into the middle of the 20th century to get Brennan, and then I 
think from there it’s Kennedy. 
So yes, although I’m not sure why. I’m interested in Eugene’s 
hypothesis, and then I’ll offer my small non-hypothesis. 
Professor Eugene Volokh: I don’t know why. I do think it’s 
generally true. I think it’s quite right that when it comes to 
1
et al.: Panel 3: Free Speech and Freedom of Religion
Published by Reading Room,
938 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:Supp. 
government in certain kinds of managerial roles, especially as 
employer, he was less protective, though it’s not just him. 
For instance, if you look at the Janus case, Justice Kagan, for the 
four liberals, was willing to totally throw government employee 
speech, more generally, under the bus, basically saying that any time 
an employee says something that is on the job and about the job to 
colleagues, that’s constitutionally, categorically unprotected; even 
Chief Justice Rehnquist—then-Associate Justice Rehnquist—wasn’t 
willing to go that far in restricting their speech. 
So, government employee speech is a complicated question. I 
think the case that Mike was probably most referring to is Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, which I think is a difficult case, although quite possibly 
one which Justice Kennedy and the other conservatives in the 
majority got it wrong. 
But in general, yes. Certainly, in his era on the Court, he was the 
Justice who was most consistently speech protective, although not 
entirely, not always speech protective. 
Professor Dorf: So now I’m going to offer my hypothesis. I have a 
two-part hypothesis. I will try not to give a speech. If you want the 
longer version, it’s on my blog today, dorfonlaw.org. 
Professor Segall: I recommend Dorf on Law, by the way. All right. 
Professor Dorf: So, one—my sort of null hypothesis is that Justice 
Kennedy was simply an applied libertarian when it came to speech. 
He believes in liberty generally. The word “liberty” appears all over 
his opinions. Planned Parenthood v. Casey begins with “Liberty . . . 
.” It’s there in the gay rights cases. And so, if you’re a libertarian, 
here you’ve got a provision of the Constitution talking about the right 
to freedom of speech, free exercise of religion shall not be abridged. 
Sure, it’s a nice fit. 
In this view, Kennedy is unlike Holmes, who has a theory of the 
marketplace of ideas. He’s not like Brandeis, who has a theory of the 
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role of speech in promoting self-government. John Hart Ely has an 
elaborate conception of free speech that that sort of builds on the 
work of the Warren Court in reinforcing representation. Kennedy 
doesn’t have anything like any of that. He’s just a libertarian, and the 
First Amendment reads like a very libertarian provision. That’s my 
null hypothesis. 
My slightly revised hypothesis builds on something Justice 
Kennedy told me in private but I don’t think I’m telling tales out of 
school. There was a case decided the term I clerked which posed, 
among other things, the question whether the mall-like areas of an 
airport are a public forum. 
Now, if you know free speech doctrine, you know that whether a 
government property counts as a public forum or some other kind of 
forum is significant for how much power the government has to 
restrict speech there. And the majority on this point said no. Justice 
Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he said yes, it should be 
considered a public forum. But it’s technically a concurrence because 
of the way they decided the case. 
Now for the revelation. Before a case was argued, Justice Kennedy 
would sometimes gather his law clerks in his chambers to talk 
through the issues. And he’d have whichever law clerk had written 
the bench memo or otherwise prepared it give a little presentation. 
And then we’d all talk it through. It was our own little intra-chambers 
oral argument. And it was a lot of fun. He didn’t do it in all the cases, 
but he did it in the ones where he thought we would all be interested. 
I don’t remember whether I was the law clerk on the case or one of 
my co-clerks was. In any event, one of us presents it. The case 
involved Hare Krishnas handing out literature and soliciting funds in 
one of the New York-area airports. One of my co-clerks says, “You 
know, people, when people are traveling through airports, they’re in 
a hurry. They’re stressed. I think about my grandmother. She doesn’t 
want to be bothered by these people. They’re annoying.” 
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Justice Kennedy gets a little twinkle in his eye, and he turns to my 
co-clerk. He says, “The point of the First Amendment is to annoy 
people.” 
So, I think that played a little bit of a role in his First Amendment 
jurisprudence 
Professor Segall: So, we should spend, I think, a fair amount of time 
on Citizens United because I think, if we look back from historical 
perspective, Citizens United will be one of the defining, historical 
cases both for Justice Kennedy and of this time period. 
Before we get into Justice Kennedy’s role in all that, I think it’s a 
very misunderstood case in the sense that I assume both of you—I 
know you—but I assume both of you agree, the result, the narrow 
result, was correct. Do I have that correct? And maybe you could 
tell—just go through it a little bit, the facts, the holding, and how 
they had to rule the way they did, I think. 
Professor Dorf: You mean as applied to the feature-length film? 
Professor Segall: Yes. 
Professor Dorf: Yeah, I think that’s right. 
Professor Segall: Give the background. 
Professor Volokh: Well, so Citizens United was an organization, 
organized as a corporation, that got contributions from, among other 
things, business corporations. And they were distributing videos, 
generally from the Right—probably exclusively from the Right—and 
one of them was a long criticism of Hillary Clinton, who was then, I 
think, running for office. 
And a federal statute barred non-media corporations from spending 
general treasury funds—so just the normal funds that they have as 
opposed to some specialized, limited, segregated fund—spending 
their funds to advocate for or against candidates for office. The 
statute had to do with television and radio ads, and there were 
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particular limitations on such ads within some amount of time of the 
election. I think those were in play in that case as well. 
In any event, the Court said this was unconstitutional. So, I take it 
Eric’s point was that maybe the dissenters got it wrong in saying that 
Citizens United could be restricted this way because Citizens United 
was pretty clearly a media entity and maybe should have these First 
Amendment rights as a media entity to speak out through the form of 
distributing DVDs. 
But the majority reached a broader conclusion. It concluded that 
corporations, as well as unions, which are treated the same way under 
the relevant statutory schemes, categorically have the right to speak 
about all sorts of topics, including candidates for office. Just as in 
1978, the Court, by a five-four vote, said that they have the right to 
speak about ballot measures, so they have the right to speak about 
candidates. 
In the process, they reversed a decision, a six-three decision, called 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which had in 1990 held 
the opposite, had said there’s basically an exception to corporate free 
speech rights for speech about candidates. 
Note, by the way, that it was very well settled at the time that 
corporations have First Amendment rights more generally. This had 
been established in 1936, essentially, as to media corporations. And 
then in 1941 or 1945, depending on how you count it, the Court made 
that clear about business corporations as well. So, it was really quite 
well settled. 
The question was whether there was a special rule for non-media 
corporations when they wanted to speak about candidates. And the 
majority said no, there is no such special rule, that just as 
corporations can speak about lots of other topics, and just as media 
corporations can speak about candidates and routinely do spend a lot 
of money from the general treasury speaking about candidates, so 
non-media business corporations, either directly or through 
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contributing money to other groups like Citizens United, have the 
right to do the same. 
Professor Segall: Do you agree that the result was correct? 
Professor Dorf: Yes. Citizens United was re-argued after being 
initially argued as a relatively narrow statutory case. During one of 
the oral arguments, the question was posed to the lawyer defending 
the statute, “under your theory of treating this feature-length film 
called ‘Hillary: The Movie’ as campaign speech, under your theory 
could the statute be validly applied to a book?” And he said yes. And 
the conventional wisdom is that was the end of the case. And then it 
was just a question of how it was going to be written up. 
The problem with the dissent is that, while it’s very good at 
showing all the ways in which there are problems with the majority, 
especially as Eric, the other Eric, pointed out on a previous panel, the 
fact that the—I lost my train of thought. Where’d he go? Yeah, what 
was your point? 
Professor Eric Berger: That the majority undervalues— 
Professor Dorf: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Right, the corruption. Right, 
that the majority dismisses any notion of corruption other than quid-
pro-quo bribery. So that’s a real problem, although it’s not a problem 
unique to Citizens United. It is a problem, if it is a problem, in the 
whole line of campaign-finance cases. 
Alright, so the dissent’s very good. But they don’t offer a limiting 
principle. What can be said in favor of the majority’s approach, or at 
least the outcome, is that there are very, very hard line-drawing 
problems if you’re going to say that some corporate speech is 
allowed and other kinds of corporate speech are not allowed. 
Professor Segall: And in fact, when the case was re-argued, Elena 
Kagan as Solicitor General was asked the same question about books. 
And she— 
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Professor Dorf: Oh, yeah. It was Kagan. That’s right. 
Professor Segall: It was both. And Justice Kagan kind of fumbled 
the question because there is no good answer to that question. 
So, if we agree that the government may not censor or block a 
movie about Hillary Clinton thirty or sixty days before an election, I 
assume most of us would agree with that. Then— 
Professor Volokh: Not the four dissenters. They were fine with the 
government censoring that. 
Professor Segall: How did Citizens United grow to be the symbol of 
everything that’s wrong in America, which is what, in terms of 
politics, which is what it currently is in a lot of the popular media? 
Professor Volokh: So, in the middle of the last decade, I saw this. 
I’m sure many of you observed this about the PATRIOT Act—
people were saying, for instance, that in Guantanamo, all these 
people are being detained under the PATRIOT Act. Nothing 
whatsoever to do with the PATRIOT Act; it just became a stand-in 
for what some people viewed as abuses .in the War on Terror. But 
that simply reflects people’s lack of k/nowledge about what the 
Patriot Act or Citizens United actually did. Ilya’s here, he could tell 
us all about voter ignorance. But al of you know that ignorance is an 
natural human state. I’m ignorant of lots and lots of things. I probably 
have similar short-hands in my mind for things that I don’t know. 
The symbolic meaning of Citizens United that you mentioned simply 
reflects the fact that the public, including many activists, doesn’t 
really think much about these details, because they’re not paid to. 
They’ve got day jobs. 
So really, I think what Mike was alluding to is Buckley v. Valeo 
said—today quite controversially, at the time, it was seven-one. It 
said essentially that notwithstanding what I think all of us have to 
acknowledge are real risks of subtle corruption stemming from 
independent expenditures, and the fact that some people have more 
money to spend than others, that nonetheless people have a right to 
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buy an ad in a newspaper saying, “Oppose Senator Sasse because he 
backs Brett Kavanaugh,” let’s say. People have a right to do that. 
That’s a part of their First Amendment right to spend their own 
money to do that. 
Once you say that, it becomes much harder to say, “But they can’t 
do that through the form of a corporation or through the form of a 
union,” which is what federal election law did for a time, under 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. FEC. 
So, I think that to people Citizens United becomes a stand-in for 
free speech principles applied to protect people’s ability to spend 
money to talk about elections. I think a lot of the critics of Citizens 
United also don’t think about the media, which has, again, an 
unquestioned right to spend money about elections, a right that could 
also lead to inequality and corruption. Indeed, the broadly accepted 
rights of the media, including the corporate-owned media, are part of 
the reason for Buckley, and clearly part of the reasoning of Citizens 
United. Among other things, it’s too hard to draw the line, and kind 
of improper to draw the line, between some business corporations 
who speak about these things for a living having the right to do that 
and other business corporations (and rich individuals) who want to 
speak about it briefly not having the right to do that. 
Professor Segall: Mike, do you agree—because I don’t—that the 
line between the New York Times and Fox News and media 
corporations and Exxon would be too hard to draw or harder to draw 
than an infinite number of lines redrawing constitutional law every 
day? 
Professor Dorf: I think it is a hard line to draw. Most media 
corporations are—I don’t know about “most”—many media 
corporations are divisions of giant mega-corporations that have all 
sorts of other business. 
Now, it is considered responsible journalism to separate the 
business side from the editorial and news side of the organization. 
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But one of the things that we’ve seen not just in this area but in other 
areas, like for example, under state law for journalists’ privilege to 
shield sources, is that it’s much harder than it used to be to 
distinguish who’s a journalist from everybody else. 
Am I a journalist? I have a blog. 
I thought about this pretty hard a few months ago because one of 
my co-bloggers, not Eric, published a leak on my blog. She ran it by 
me first, and I decided to do it because I concluded that I am a 
journalist, and I didn’t know her source, and I didn’t want to know 
her source, so she would be the one who would have to go to jail if 
there were a judicial order. 
But I think it’s a similar problem, given the nature of these 
corporations. I don’t think it’s impossible, and I think there would be 
a bunch of sort of arbitrary decisions at the boundary. One question is 
whether you think that it’s more important to have clearer lines with 
respect to freedom of speech than with respect to other contexts. 
Professor Volokh: As it happens, I wrote an article about this some 
years back, looking at American law from the framing to the present. 
I don’t think original meaning is necessarily dispositive; I mostly 
analyze matters in light of more modern precedents. But I think 
everybody acknowledges that original meaning matters—even liberal 
Justices do—and that tradition matters. 
And in fact, basically almost without exception, from around the 
time of the framing to 1970, American courts said there is no special 
First Amendment right for the media. The freedom of the press is not 
the freedom of an industry or a business, an occupation called “the 
press.” Rather, “the press” refers to the printing press; it’s the 
freedom of all to use the technology of mass communication. And of 
course, today I think that includes the modern technologies that are 
heirs of the printing press, such as the Internet. 
And then since 1970, I found basically a dozen lower-court cases 
taking the opposite view. A few Supreme Court cases also seemed to 
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left open the possibility that maybe the results might be different as 
to libel law, but the Court ultimately never took that up. 
So, the doctrine that a particular line of business known as “the 
media” does not get any special First Amendment rights—it may 
sometimes get special statutory rights under some statutes, but no 
special First Amendment rights—is a very well established and 
traditional American doctrine. And I think today it’s even clearer 
than before, because the technology makes it so much harder to tell 
who is a member of the press and who is not. 
Professor Segall: So, my last question about Citizens United, I think, 
is did it change American politics? Because there is a huge 
perception that where the infusion of money and politics was always 
an issue in American politics, it became much worse after Citizens 
United. 
Professor Dorf: Maybe. Part of the problem is that the Federal 
Elections Commission was set up to be a completely ineffective 
regulatory body. One of the things Justice Kennedy says to try to 
limit what the damage that he potentially sees is, “Well, don’t worry, 
there’s always disclosure.” 
And so, the move that is allowed by both the FEC and the IRS to 
501(c)(4)s—that is to say that these so-called public welfare 
organizations that are then essentially ways of laundering money—
that’s not protected by the First Amendment under Citizens United. 
But, it’s happened, and it’s not clear to me what the relation between 
that and Citizens United is. But, I think that’s a big piece. Although 
that’s different from independent expenditures by corporations. 
Professor Volokh: So, my understanding—and I tried to look this up 
a couple of years ago and couldn’t get any really solid data—is that 
corporations have not taken that much advantage of the options made 
available by Citizens United. If anything, unions have taken more. 
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Again, remember, the limitations in the statute were on both 
corporations and unions. And the Supreme Court, in Citizens United, 
said both corporations and unions have these free speech rights. 
Interestingly, in California, California law had never banned 
corporate spending. And actually, I did look that up; there was good 
data. Corporations spent less than unions, less than individuals, and 
less than Indian tribes. 
So, my sense is that, while there’s been a lot of money spent on 
various races, business corporations, sort of the GMs of the world, 
have not ended up spending a huge portion of what is being spent. 
Professor Dorf: Can I say one final thing on that? So that suggests 
that the real problem, to the extent that there has been an uptick in 
money in politics, it’s high-wealth individuals—the Mercers, the 
Koch brothers, Sheldon Adelson, there are probably people on the 
liberal side that I don’t see demonized as frequently because of what 
I’m reading—that are able to give enormous amounts of money 
through independent expenditures. The elimination of the aggregate 
limits in McCutcheon doesn’t do much for that because the aggregate 
limit was not what was doing the work for them. 
That’s a function of Citizens United, but only insofar as it 
maintains Buckley’s distinction between independent expenditures 
and contributions. 
Professor Segall: And one closing note about Citizens United, 
because it’s about Justice Kennedy, the rumor, the behind-the-scenes 
gossip is that it was Justice Kennedy who really forced Justice 
Roberts’s hand to keep the case over one term to reach the broader 
issues in the case. If that is all true, it doesn’t sound like Justice 
Kennedy to me. So, he must’ve been feeling very strongly about this, 
because they did end up deciding issues that the briefs did not bring 
forward very intentionally, in a way the Court doesn’t normally do. 
There’s been a lot of talk recently, and some articles in the New 
York Times and other places, that the First Amendment is being 
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Lochner-ized. And what the critics mean by that is, in the Janus case 
involving union dues and the abortion case out of California this term 
and a bunch of others, the Court is using the First Amendment to 
deregulate in a way that, if they didn’t use speech, they would be 
criticized for doing Lochner. But because it is speech, it is somehow 
different. And I’m wondering if you guys had thoughts on that. 
Professor Volokh: So, I’ve always thought that the main criticism of 
Lochner is that the liberty of contracts, setting aside the obligation of 
the Contracts Clause, doesn’t appear in the Constitution. But 
enforcing a constitutional right to deregulate things when it comes to 
speech, well, that’s been the history of free speech law. So, I don’t 
quite see the force of that objection as such. 
Now, there are particular sub-objections you can make, or 
particular echoes of that. One might be that one shouldn’t use free 
speech in order to free businesses from regulations of fundamentally 
business-related communications. That was, in fact, Justice 
Rehnquist’s objection, with citations to Lochner, in the commercial 
speech cases, where the driving forces on the other side were Justices 
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. 
But Justice Rehnquist lost that battle. Eventually, he gave up on 
that. And even he ended up being an occasional voice to protect 
commercial speech rights. 
Sorrell is the most recent case—Sorrell v. IMS Health—that might 
fit the mold of the First Amendment being used to protect business 
communications. And in fact, the dissent, I think was Justice Breyer, 
raised that objection there. The majority there was the conservatives 
plus Justice Sotomayor, though Justice Sotomayor has expressed 
some doubt about Sorrell recently. 
That wasn’t exactly a commercial advertising case but had to do 
with aggregation of data by businesses. So you could imagine that 
kind of objection.  
12
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But it has nothing to do with Janus. It has nothing to do with the 
pregnancy crisis center regulations; they’re not being regulated as 
commercially businesses, they’re quite clearly nonprofits, generally 
speaking, providing, I think, basically free services. So any objection 
in those cases has to be based on something other than the 
regulability of commercial transactions. 
Another objection might be that in Janus, for example, this is sort 
of upsetting the relationship between labor and management 
hammered out by legislatures. But again, upsetting legislative 
regulation has been the history of the First Amendment and labor 
law. To be sure, First Amendment law has at times, I think often 
incorrectly, upheld certain restrictions on labor speech and 
sometimes restriction on employer speech. But ever since the late 
1930s, the Court has been saying the First Amendment does impose 
substantial restraints in the labor-law area. 
Now, I actually think Janus is wrong because I think the 
unanimous decision in Abood was wrong. I think that, in fact, just as 
a substantive matter, there should be no problem with compelling 
people to contribute money to unions, or to Sierra Club, or NRA, or 
whatever else. I think it’s often a bad idea. But setting aside maybe 
contributing to parties, I don’t think that that’s something that should 
be seen as unconstitutional. But I’m very unusual in that respect. And 
this objection has nothing to do with the Lochner objection. I think 
the broad Lochner objection really has no merit to it. 
Professor Dorf: I agree with Eugene descriptively but not 
normatively, at least in part. 
In Sorrell, there’s this remarkable line where Justice Kennedy is 
pushing back against the Lochner argument. And he quotes Holmes’s 
famous dissent in Lochner. So, Holmes says, “The Constitution does 
not enact Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” Herbert Spencer wrote a 
book called Social Statics, which was basically what we would now 
call a libertarian tract. 
13
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Kennedy quotes Holmes. He says, “The Constitution doesn’t enact 
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. It does enact the First Amendment.” 
He draws exactly the line that Eugene draws. It’s a good line. And 
when I say “a good line,” I mean it is a good turn of phrase. I don’t 
think it’s a good legal line for Justice Kennedy to draw for two basic 
reasons. One is, it relies on a sharp distinction between enumerated 
and unenumerated rights, which Justice Kennedy generally rejected. 
That is, he was not somebody who thought that substantive due 
process only incorporates the Bill of Rights and that there are no 
unenumerated rights. We had a whole panel on his expansive idea of 
unenumerated rights. So, he can’t rely on the fact that there is an 
explicit enumeration of a free speech right because he thinks there 
can be other rights that are unenumerated. 
Second, I think what the meaning of the overruling of Lochner is is 
highly contested. And it’s contested because the meaning of 
Holmes’s dissent in Lochner is unclear. On the one hand, there’s 
language of general judicial restraint, and that was the view of people 
like Felix Frankfurter, who thought that when the Court in West 
Coast Hotel overruled Lochner, it was just sort of going to defer to 
legislative action full stop. 
But, there’s also the idea that the Constitution does not embody a 
particular economic theory that says that this was a retreat from 
aggressive judicial review with respect to regulation of the economy 
as to which Supreme Court Justices have no special expertise, and the 
rough and tumble of politics is the proper forum. 
If that’s your view, then it doesn’t much matter whether your 
textual basis for intervention is the Due Process Clause or the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. You still want to leave that 
to the rough and tumble of politics. 
So, while I do think that the worry that the Court is going to 
reinstate Lochner but just under the First Amendment is overblown, I 
don’t think it’s an analytically problematic idea. 
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Professor Segall: I do want to say that Adam Liptak, who was 
supposed to be on this panel and who wrote the column about 
Lochner-izing the First Amendment or quoted a lot of law professors 
in that column, I wish he was here to push back because I do think 
there is a lot of judicial aggression in the First Amendment cases of 
the last ten years that’s reminiscent of Lochner. 
And I will also say that Eugene wrote an excellent amicus brief in 
the Janus case with Professor Will Baude that I was hoping would 
convince Justice Kennedy. But apparently, it did not. 
Professor Volokh: We were hoping, too. 
So, the First Amendment has been used aggressively against 
legislation since 1931. 
Now, you’re limiting your statement to cases reminiscent of 
Lochner. But it’s interesting how much gets thrown in within that 
rubric. At least Janus you could say, well, again, that’s labor 
relations. But again the First Amendment has been used aggressively 
in the area of striking down what are seen as undue restrictions on 
both employers’ speech and employees’ speech, union speech, since 
the late 1930s. 
But NIFLA, the case involving disclosures by pregnancy 
counseling centers, whatever it is, it’s not a regulation of commerce. 
It’s not that “Oh, we’re trying to deal with the influence of kind of 
powerful, moneyed interests who are duping consumers or who are 
mis-paying their employees” or whatever. 
Now, you could talk about other things there. You could say that 
maybe when you’re regulating speech about health that’s done by 
people who are sort of like the professionals we’ve historically 
regulated, then you should be free to do that. But rejecting such 
speech restrictions is not at all Lochner. And this seems to me to 
show that this Lochner-izing trope is being used basically to 
condemn all these decisions to strike down speech restrictions that 
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the trope users dislike, without any real explanation of where the line 
is going to be drawn. 
Professor Segall: No, I think that’s fair. I think by Lochner what that 
article wrote and what some law professors think is it’s overreaching, 
overextending the way Lochner did, not because it’s business, it’s 
just overreaching. 
Professor Volokh: Right. Right. So what it really means is it’s 
reaching free speech decisions to strike down statutes that we think 
are wrong. 
Professor Segall: Exactly. 
Professor Volokh: That’s really the only use of Lochner. It’s similar 
on the theory that Lochner was wrong, and these are wrong. Well, all 
right. People have been criticizing the Court’s free speech decisions 
on the grounds that they are wrong for almost 100 years now. 
Professor Segall: So, we’re going to transition now from speech to 
religion. And we’re going to get less doctrinal, at least to begin with, 
because during the term that Mike did clerk for Justice Kennedy, 
which was the term Justice Kennedy came out, sort of speaking, 
because prior to that term he had voted with Justice Rehnquist, I 
believe, 94% or 96% of the time. And then in 1991, ‘92, he joined the 
Casey decision, which we talked about. And he authored Lee v. 
Weisman, which struck down prayers at high school graduation 
ceremonies. And he did that after endorsing a coercion test for 
Establishment Clause cases that—in other areas—that suggested 
unless the government makes you do something, the Establishment 
Clause isn’t violated, and those graduation ceremonies were 
voluntary. So, this was a decision that angered the Right maybe as 
much as Casey in the short term. 
Do we have a theory as to why Justice Kennedy did that? And part 
of that is, did he have an overall religion clause jurisprudence? 
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Professor Dorf: Let me fill in a little bit of the details. So the main 
test for whether a law violates the Establishment Clause is the so-
called “Lemon test.” It’s not the exclusive test, and it’s been 
criticized in various ways. And it has three pieces, whether the 
government’s primary purpose is to advance religion, whether the 
primary effect is to advance religion, and whether there is undue 
entanglement between government and religion. And failing any one 
of those prongs means that the law is invalid. And as I said, it’s been 
criticized to a great degree. 
Justice O’Connor had been pushing the ideat that the way to tell 
whether the primary effect of a law is to advance religion is to ask 
whether it impermissibly endorses either a particular religion or 
religion in general and thus communicates to nonbelievers or 
dissenters that they are somehow outside of the community. And she 
had been pushing that a little bit before Justice Kennedy joined the 
Court. He joins the Court, and he pushes back and says, “No, the 
question should not be endorsement. It should be whether the law 
coerces religion.” 
Now, this has always struck me as a peculiar analytical move 
because whether one is being coerced into participating in a religious 
exercise is a matter of free exercise rather than establishment. 
The key dissent in which Kennedy promotes his coercion test 
Allegheny case, which was a public display case. But his tone is very 
much sort of grievance politics. It sounds like he’s complaining about 
the War on Christmas. But he has one very peculiar line where he’s 
explaining the—I’m sorry, It’s a very long-winded answer. He’s 
explaining his— 
Professor Segall: You were there. It’s okay. 
Professor Dorf: Well, I wasn’t there in ‘89. 
He’s explaining his coercion test, and he says, “Well, you know, 
maybe a permanent Latin cross on city hall, that might go too far.” 
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And he said, “Well, how would that be coercive? That would be an 
endorsement.” So, it’s very sort of confused. 
And then in 1992 in Lee v. Weisman, he says, “Well, a prayer at a 
high school graduation, that violates the Establishment Clause.” Even 
though you’re not technically required to go to the high school 
graduation, even though there’s no requirement that you even 
participate in the prayer, you could just sit or stand quietly and 
respectfully. And so people said, “Well, what’s going on here?” 
What I think is going on there, in both his adoption of the coercion 
test and the application of it, is Justice Kennedy’s libertarianism. 
That is, the Establishment Clause, insofar as we think of it as having 
a structural value, sort of leaves him cold. What he really cares about 
is liberty, and he’s imagining high school students at their graduation 
who have a choice not to go, but it’s not a real choice. Everybody 
wants to go. And there’s going to be all sorts of peer pressure. And so 
Kennedy may be right or he may be wrong. But either way he’s a 
libertarian—he’s trying funnel liberty through the Establishment 
Clause. 
Professor Volokh: So I think that all makes a lot of sense. And I just 
want to try to elaborate a little more by stepping back and explaining 
what I think is the problem as to government religious speech: 
prayers, crèches, and the like. 
Let me just start with a bit about myself. I am completely 
irreligious. My parents came from the Soviet Union. They 
disapproved of virtually everything they were taught by the 
communists. But that whole scientific atheism thing? It made sense 
to them. That’s how I was brought up. That’s me. 
So I come to America, and I don’t end up being much acculturated 
into American religious traditions, either. To this day, if you watch 
me during a Pledge of Allegiance, I won’t say “under God.” 
Likewise, I generally affirm rather than swearing. 
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But I think that the Court has made a big mistake in trying to root 
out speech that endorses religion. First, it led the Court to all sorts of 
contortions. And it led ultimately, I think, to much more religious 
tension than the Court was supposedly fixing through that the 
endorsement test. I think that what Justice Kennedy was trying to do 
with his coercion approach, which I’m not sure is a great success 
either, is to try to offer an alternative to the endorsement test, a test 
that I think is ultimately doomed to failure. 
And the reason why is simply that American culture, both in the 
past and today, is chock-full of religious references from a religious 
people. We see that in the names of cities, back where I live now, in 
California, of course, from the Catholic tradition: Los Angeles, 
Sacramento, San Francisco. But of course there’s also Providence, 
Rhode Island. 
We see that in the Star-Spangled Banner. One of the stanzas—we 
generally don’t sing it, but it’s there—says “Let this be our motto, in 
God is our trust.” 
The Declaration of Independence, occasionally people say, “Well, 
you know, ‘nature’s God’ and ‘their creator,’ that’s just sort of this 
general deism. That’s not really about an activist God.” Well, except 
you get to the end, and they talk about how they appeal to the 
supreme judge of nations, not just a watchmaker god, and have a firm 
reliance on the protection of divine providence. 
Now, I don’t want to speak to whether Jefferson actually believed 
that. But Jefferson presumably knew his audience and knew what his 
audience cared about. 
So if you really take seriously the endorsement test, you need to 
essentially engage in a campaign of extirpating every such reference. 
It’s not quite like the Taliban blowing up the Buddhas. And it may be 
for a better purpose. But I think that’s way it comes across to a lot of 
religious people. Certainly, that’s the way it comes across to me. 
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This is not what Justice O’Connor—my former boss, but with 
whom I disagree on this—wanted to do with the endorsement test. 
But the problem is the endorsement test, taken seriously, tended to 
lead to that result, because in fact all these references, however 
historical, are in some measure endorsement of religion, perhaps in 
part because they’re so tied to our nation’s key documents. 
But she understandably wasn’t willing to let it go to that. So then 
there had to be all of these epicycles in order to make this flawed 
system work. “So, well, ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance isn’t 
really religious, it’s patriotic.” I don’t buy that. 
Professor Segall: Justice Brennan said that. 
Professor Volokh: That’s true. And in the early school-prayer cases, 
for instance, he suggested that legislative prayer was fine, but then in 
the legislative prayer case, he actually kind of walked that back. 
People who have been promoting the endorsement test or earlier 
versions of the test have long said, “Oh, no, no, of course it wouldn’t 
lead to those results.” And then it began to lead to those results. 
Justice Kennedy was trying to react to that and trying to focus on 
coercion rather than just on what offends people through its 
religiosity. First, offensiveness, is in the eyes of the beholder, but 
second, some amount of offensiveness is going to be inevitable either 
from religious references or from removal of religious references. 
I’m not sure he did a good job dealing with these issues in Lee v. 
Weisman, but I think it’s ultimately his coercion approach is more 
worthwhile than trying to get rid of every religious reference or 
references that endorse religion, which ends up either amounting to 
removing all religious references or amounting to nothing really 
predictable. 
Professor Dorf: Just as one final thought on this. People talk a lot 
about Lee v. Weisman. It’s one of the two cases that I can think of in 
which Justice Kennedy is with the liberals in an Establishment 
Clause case, the other one being the follow-up to it, involving 
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student-led prayer. Overwhelmingly, he’s voting to uphold—
challenge practices when people say that they violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
Professor Segall: Well, and I want to mention that just a few years 
ago in the Greece case, where a town in upstate New York had 
exclusively Christian prayers at their legislature, Justice Kennedy 
went the other way. And the decision was completely different in 
almost every way from Lee v. Weisman because it turns out children 
had to go to that legislature once or twice a year as part of a civics 
day and see only Christian prayers. And I’m wondering if— 
Professor Dorf: But seeing is different from participating in, right? 
His line in Lee v. Weisman is that the students are going to feel 
coerced to participate. That’s different from witnessing. 
Professor Volokh: No, I actually don’t quite agree— 
Professor Dorf: I think the case was wrongly decided. But, I think 
that’s how he would distinguish it. 
Professor Volokh: So two things to note. One thing about Greece is, 
at that point, the dissenters, the liberals said, “You know, we are fine 
with legislative prayer, generally.” That’s the Marsh v. Chambers 
decision, which was six to three in the early 1980s, but is now 
unanimously accepted. Even the liberals, I would assume, are on 
board with the endorsement test more or less (though with Breyer, 
it’s hard to tell). But, even they are willing to say, “Well, legislative 
prayers generally are so historically accepted that that battle’s over 
and done with.” 
The second thing: A common argument in a lot of these 
Establishment Clause cases is that the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause is to diminish religious divisiveness. That was an argument 
often given early in the Lemon era for why certain kinds of 
restrictions were seen as excessively entangling. That was also an 
argument that Justice Breyer embraced as a part of his test in Van 
Orden v. Perry, one of the Ten Commandments cases. 
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Here is my conjecture, though perhaps social scientists can tell me 
more because this is just seat-of-the-pants perception. My sense is 
that attempts to restrict government religious speech have created 
much more religious divisiveness and much more hostility to my 
group, which is the irreligious, than the underlying religious speech 
actually did.  
Now, you might say, “That’s the fault of the opponents of the 
endorsement test. They’re the ones who are being divisive because 
they’re speaking out against these just, righteous decisions.” But then 
that stops being a divisiveness inquiry. It becomes a claim, “Well, 
here is the right answer, and we don’t care if it’s divisive or not.” 
And if your concern is really divisiveness, then my guess is that 
taking a hands-off approach in this area, which is, “Government can 
say more or less whatever it pleases, leave it to the political process 
and leave it to political accommodation,” would yield less religious 
divisiveness. I also think it would lead to less of a sense, in many 
respects, of aggrievement: Once you tell people you have a 
constitutional right to be free from endorsements, then things that 
they themselves might have largely ignored as just interesting 
historical carryovers now become violations of their rights. So I think 
the endorsement test and its predecessors have been a real step 
backwards in this area. 
Professor Segall: And two closing points on that. Just a couple 
weeks ago, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Pensacola, Florida, to 
remove a permanent cross from one of their parks that had been there 
a very long time. And the dissenting opinion in the Eleventh Circuit 
was unusually harsh about Supreme Court precedent. 
But one other interesting thing about this area of the law, religious 
symbols on government property, is it might be one of the only major 
areas of law past 2005 where Justice Kennedy was not the swing 
vote. It turned out Justice Breyer ended up being the swing vote 
because he went both ways in the Ten Commandments case. And 
there aren’t many areas of law where Justice Kennedy— 
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Professor Dorf: And in fact, he tried to draw this line that Eugene is 
drawing, right? That is, they had these two cases. One involved a 
paper display in a courthouse. And the other— 
Professor Segall: That was Judge Moore, by the way. 
Professor Dorf: Right. And the other involved monuments in the 
park at the capitol in Austin, Texas, which are like giant stone 
monuments. Breyer thought that the giant stone monuments were 
okay, even though they were permanent, whereas the paper thing in 
the courthouse was not. But one of his reasons I think is very attuned 
to this is that if you tell them they have to remove the monuments, 
the act of removal itself is going to be a kind of religious offense to 
the people who support them. So, there’s something to that. 
Professor Segall: Yes. The people of Pensacola are pretty mad right 
now. 
I want to talk about a religion case that Justice Kennedy didn’t 
write, a huge case, but I’ve never quite understood why he joined. 
And that is the Smith case, Oregon v. Smith. So, one of the big 
questions in constitutional law has been, for a long time, do generally 
applicable laws that burden religious practices, do people of faith get 
to get exemptions from that? And from 1963 to 1990, the Supreme 
Court set up a balancing test. And then Justice Scalia ended all of that 
in 1990, saying that no, the Free Exercise Clause does not require any 
free exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws. 
Justice Kennedy joined that opinion. And we’re going to hear later 
from Professor Griffin, I think, about Kennedy’s views on judicial 
supremacy. And he clearly had those views. Justice Kennedy struck 
down more laws than any Justice. But he was willing to take the 
Court out of the evaluation of religious exemptions. And I’m 
wondering if you have theories as to why that was one area where he 
said no judge—he agreed with Scalia—“Judges shouldn’t be in this 
business at all.” 
Professor Dorf: I don’t have a good answer to that. 
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I want to make two observations. One is how remarkable it is that 
the political or ideological valence of religious exemptions has 
completely flipped from that time. In 1990, it’s the liberals, mostly—
not Stevens, who didn’t like religion in either free exercise or 
establishment cases—but the other liberals are in dissent. They want 
people to be able to have exemptions. And it’s the conservatives 
saying, “No, no exemptions. You have to follow the same rules as 
everybody else.” And then along comes a case like Hobby Lobby, 
and it’s the conservatives who are all on board, and the liberals are on 
the other side. 
Now, one case is constitutional, the other is statutory. You can 
thread the doctrinal needle. But in terms of the respective druthers, 
you want to know, well, what’s going on. An obvious legal realist 
answer is that in Smith what’s going on is it’s a minority religion, it’s 
a Native American practice of smoking peyote, so the liberals are 
sympathetic. They’re thinking of it as a kind of cultural rights case. 
The conservatives are thinking that these are just druggies. Whereas 
now, it’s Christians who are claiming the exceptions. 
And I think there’s something to that, except that everybody 
should have been smart enough in Smith to know that whatever rule 
they’re laying down in that case is going to apply to conservative 
Christians also. And so that’s not a sufficient explanation. 
The best that I can come up with respect to Justice Kennedy there 
is that what Scalia does in his opinion is to assimilate the Free 
Exercise Clause to a larger body of doctrine mostly involving equal 
protection and freedom of speech, which doesn’t generally have 
exceptions. It’s very sort of rule oriented. 
And for all that we’ve talked about Justice Kennedy’s 
anti-formalism and nonstandard approach to doctrine, he was pretty 
doctrinal in the free speech area. So, insofar as Scalia saying, “Hey, 
look. If this were speech you wouldn’t get an exception. And 
religion’s part of the same First Amendment,” Kennedy is willing to 
go along on doctrinal grounds. 
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That’s my hypothesis. I don’t have a lot of faith in it. 
Professor Volokh: So, I think there are two quite different things 
one needs to think about here. One is the constitutional side and the 
other is the statutory exemptions. 
I think as a constitutional matter, to me the interesting question is 
why Justice White joined the majority in the Employment Division v. 
Smith case. The majority was written by Justice Scalia. It was joined 
by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, who had long been critics of the 
religious-exemption regime; Smith was basically building on the 
arguments made by Rehnquist and Stevens before It was joined by 
Justice Kennedy. And it was joined by and Justice White. 
Now, Justice White had not long been a critic of that the religious 
exemption regime. He was with the majority in granting the 
exemption in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Amish parents case. And he 
was the only Justice who would have voted to give relief to the 
American Indian claimant in Bowen v. Roy. It was eight to one, and 
he was the one who had the broadest view of the religious exemption 
regime. 
So why did he change his view? And I think part of my sense is 
that the Court’s experience with the free exercise jurisprudence from 
1963 to 1990 showed it was pretty badly broken and that Justice 
Scalia’s approach seemed to offer a good alternative to that. Under 
the so-called Sherbert/Yoder model, from the two leading cases that 
adopted it, basically any time a religious person sincerely claimed 
that they were being pressured to do something that they weren’t 
allowed to do under their religion, or barred from doing something 
they were required to, they’d have to get an exemption unless the law 
could pass strict scrutiny. 
Now that’s much like the RFRA test, or RLUIPA, which is the 
prison version of RFRA. But the Sherbert/Yoder rule adopted that 
strict scrutiny approach as a constitutional matter. It wasn’t just up to 
Congress or the legislature to decide whether to create these 
25
et al.: Panel 3: Free Speech and Freedom of Religion
Published by Reading Room,
962 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:Supp. 
exemptions. Nor could the legislature say, “You know, you’re giving 
exemptions from this law that we think do undermine a compelling 
interest,” And therefore reject the exemptions. The legislature 
couldn’t do anything about to cancel such exemptions. 
It seems to me that this is not a particularly appealing approach. 
It’s an interesting question what the original meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause might have been; there was a later case, City of 
Boerne v. Flores, where there was debate about the original meaning. 
But setting that aside, I don’t think the Sherbert/Yoder approach is 
particularly appealing—giving religious objectors a constitutional 
entitlement to an exemption unless strict scrutiny is satisfied. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court during the pre-Smith era ended up 
watering down strict scrutiny in a lot of these cases in order to deny 
the exemptions. So, I think it was the right decision. And, I should 
tell you, I’ve been saying this since 1999, when I was one of the 
very, very few people—I think Mark Tushnet was another one—
saying this; and I was sharply disagreed with by most liberals on this 
point, who said that Justice Scalia was wrong here. 
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
to reinstate the religious exemption approach as a statutory matter. 
By the way, speaking of which religions are being burdened by the 
rejection of religious exemptions, City of Boerne v. Flores, where the 
Court held that RFRA couldn’t apply to state or local governments, 
rejected a claim brought by the Catholic Church. Justice Scalia, true 
to his principle, says, “You know, of course the Church should lose 
here.” 
But, the statute remains in effect as to federal law. And there are 
similar statutes in many states, as well as some state constitutional 
provisions that have been interpreted as providing similar 
protections. And RLUIPA applies that doctrine to prisons that get 
federal funds, including state prisons. 
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As to Hobby Lobby, it’s just the most prominent of three RFRA or 
RLUIPA cases the Court decided over the last ten years. One was 
Hobby Lobby, in which the claimants were Christians. Another was 
Gonzales v. O Centro, where the claimants were a hallucinogen-
using religion from Brazil. And a third was Holt v. Hobbs, where the 
claimant was a Muslim who was being barred from wearing a beard 
in prison, even a very short beard. 
In Hobby Lobby, it’s true that the Christian claimants win by a 
five-four vote. But in Holt v. Hobbs, the Muslim claimant wins by a 
nine-zero vote. In Gonzales v. O Centro, this small group, which 
actually religious beliefs are pretty similar to though less familiar 
than the American Indian claimants in Smith, win by an eight-zero 
vote. 
And indeed the religious claimants have been more successful at 
the Court under RFRA and RLUIPA than they had been under the 
Free Exercise Clause before Smith. When Justices are being asked, 
“Tell the legislature that it’s unconstitutional for you to apply this 
law to these people because of their Free Exercise Clause rights,” 
many Justices say, “No, no, no. I’m not sure I want to second-guess 
the legislature this way.” 
But if the Justices are being asked to apply a legislatively enacted 
statute to essentially carve out an exemption from another 
legislatively enacted statute, or sometimes from a mere regulation, 
then the Justices are much more likely to say, “Okay, Congress told 
us to grant these exemptions, so we’ll do it.” 
Professor Dorf: Let me just make two clarifications. First, when I 
said that there is a flip, I just meant in terms of the way this is 
perceived. 
But second, there is one way in which there is a real tension. The 
argument for the approach in Smith is partly, Justice Scalia says, that 
judges are not qualified to apply this test that balances the 
government interest against the centrality of religious practice. 
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Well, if judges are unqualified to do it, you’d think they don’t all 
of a sudden become qualified to do it under a statute. 
Professor Volokh: Well, funny you should say that. So, the article I 
wrote—I think it was in ‘98, maybe ‘99—actually is all about that. 
And it is perhaps the only article that actually says Smith is right and 
RFRA is right, too. Although, I would have written RFRA in a less 
aggressive way. 
And here is why. The thing that Scalia was objecting to, which is 
judges sort of balancing things under a kind of all-things-considered 
test, more or less, is actually what judges do utterly routinely in 
developing common law. To be sure, federal judges do that only in a 
few areas, like admiralty jurisdiction. But certainly, American judges 
do that all the time. 
They are specifically statutorily called on to do this in developing 
privileges. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 specifically says that 
privileges shall be developed by courts in light of reason and 
experience. They’re called on to do that, essentially, under the Fair 
Use doctrine, under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, although the 
interesting question is whether they were right to interpret it that way. 
But in any event, so I think what Scalia was saying—and he didn’t 
get into it in detail because I think he had no occasion to do that—is 
that we can’t have a constitutional rule that says this is 
unconstitutional if, on balance, we think that, really, your interest 
isn’t that important. To be sure, it’s something we do in areas like 
free speech and equal protection, but not across the whole area. In 
fact, I think that would be Lochner on steroids. 
But when it’s done pursuant to statutory command subject to 
possible legislative override, that, I think, is something that’s 
legitimate. 
Professor Segall: I just want to say that my original question was 
why was Kennedy shy here and almost no place else, and I’m not 
sure that we figured that out. 
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But before we take questions, we have to spend—and we have 
about three minutes to do it—on, of course, the recent travel-ban 
case. And let’s just stick to the Establishment Clause issue in the 
travel-ban case, where of course, just by very, very brief background, 
President Trump made, as a candidate and as a President early on, a 
lot of statements suggesting, of course, anti-Muslim bias and all of 
that. And the Court ends up upholding it, and Justice Kennedy writes 
a concurring opinion, and very short, kind of wringing his hands. Is 
that fair? Saying, “We have to uphold this, but I’m really afraid.” 
What does this tell us about Justice Kennedy? And is it more about 
his last term on the Court than about his career? 
Professor Dorf: Yes, right. Here you have someone who, we’ve 
said, he was the most willing to interfere with work done by the 
political branches. The most sympathetic way I can read Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Hawaii against Trump is in light of Larry 
Sager’s idea of an under-enforced constitutional norm. 
So, Professor—Dean Sager has this idea that there are certain 
constitutional norms that apply to political actors but that the courts 
don’t fully enforce because of institutional limits. But, that doesn’t 
mean the politicians don’t have an obligation to abide by a more 
robust version of them. Sager has the idea that the rational basis test 
is an example of that. 
I read Kennedy’s opinion, insofar as I’m trying to read it 
sympathetically, as saying, “Look, there are institutional reasons why 
we have to defer to the executive here, especially with respect to this 
third version of the ban, for which the government did do a lot of 
homework and put forward a justification, and yeah, maybe it’s true 
that they wouldn’t have gotten to it in the first place were it not for 
the explicit ban on Muslims. But, that’s not what this is, and if it is, 
it’s not something we can unearth. But, if it is that, that’s really bad. 
And hey, political system, deal with it.” That’s the best spin that I 
think can be put on it. 
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The problem with that is, as I say, it’s not consistent with Justice 
Kennedy’s general approach, which is not to have a robust political 
question doctrine and not to be afraid of a conflict with the political 
branches. 
Professor Segall: One minute. 
Professor Volokh: I think that the travel-ban case was a really hard 
case, and I think that Kennedy’s opinion reflects that. As a general 
matter, we have a strong norm of nondiscrimination based on 
religion. But at the same time, I think we are entitled as a nation to do 
all sorts of things having to do with our foreign relations and 
deciding whom to let in the country that are unpleasant and that 
would be forbidden if done purely domestically. That’s life in the 
world. 
I think that the travel ban was a bad idea for various reasons, one 
of which is this: there are a billion Muslims out there who have a lot 
of different beliefs. I don’t think there is an Islam. I think there are 
Islams, just like there are many strands of Christianity. 
On the other hand, let’s say somebody comes up and says, “You 
know, I’m a big believer in ISIS. I think they totally have the right 
theology and the right approach to things. I’m not a member. I 
haven’t actually committed any crimes. But, I’m a believer. I would 
like to immigrate to the U.S.” I’m not sure we need to let them in, 
even though we couldn’t restrict such speech or religious adherence 
by Americans. 
It’s like Ernst Zündel, a Holocaust denier who recently died. 
Shortly before his death, he tried to immigrate to the U.S. because his 
wife is a U.S. citizen. He was refused. I think the decision was wrong 
in its logic, but I think the underlying sentiment is probably right. We 
have to tolerate these fools here. It doesn’t mean we have to import 
them. 
Now, it may be that there should be a different rule as to religion 
than as to speech. Kleindienst v. Mandel, by the way, applies that 
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very rule to speech more or less, saying that it’s okay to exclude, for 
instance socialists, even though you couldn’t criminalize socialism. 
And again, I think the travel ban is a bad idea because there’s no 
particular reason to think those countries are that dangerous or that 
the people coming from them, with proper vetting, are that 
dangerous. But, I think that Kennedy concluded the government was 
entitled to latitude to do some unpleasant things when it comes to 
these kinds of national security and entry-from-foreign-country 
decisions. And I think he had good reason to. 
Professor Segall: And just to cap that off, and then we’ll take 
questions. One piece of data is this last term, I think, is the only term 
where Justice Kennedy voted with the conservatives in every 
five-four case and that there may be some pattern to that in his last 
term on the Court. 
Professor Dorf: Except when he was—oh, yeah. You know what? I 
take that back, yeah. 
Professor Segall: Questions from the audience? 
Professor Ilya Somin: Ilya Somin, George Mason University. I just 
have two sort of hopefully quick questions. 
One is primarily for Eugene. When he said that you would get rid 
of the non-endorsement test for the Establishment Clause, I wonder 
how far would you take that? Could, for instance, the state of Utah 
say, “We endorse Mormonism as the official religion. We think it’s 
the best religion that everyone should follow. We won’t coerce 
anybody into doing it. We’re just making that the official view of the 
state of Utah.” I wonder if, under your watch, that would be okay. 
And then the other, for everybody, really, is about Citizens United. 
The standard criticism of Kennedy in the Citizens United majority, 
generally, is that they take too narrow a view of what counts as 
corruption, that it’s not just quid pro quo, it’s spending money that 
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could lead to expectations, that the expenditure of money will 
influence elections, it will influence policy. 
If this is true, why doesn’t the same thing occur from the 
expenditure of any kind of resources or the anticipation thereof, such 
as the use of your celebrity to endorse or promote a candidacy, the 
use of various skills and positions of influence, and so on? You could 
say, “Well, those positions and skills and celebrities are deserved in a 
way that money is not.” But we know that they depend, to a large 
extent on genetics, on luck, on various other things that might not be 
very fair. 
So, is there a good reason to distinguish between the quote-
unquote “corruption of money” versus the corruption of celebrity or 
the corruption of pretty much anything else that is a resource that 
people could use to influence the political process? And obviously, 
those other resources are also very unequally distributed, in some 
cases even more unequally than money. 
Professor Volokh: So to answer the question that Ilya posed to me, I 
think it would be bad for Utah to announce that Mormonism is the 
official religion of Utah. But I’m pretty sure they didn’t do that 
before 1980, to use the date of Stone v. Graham as an early 
proto-endorsement case. There are actually pretty powerful political 
checks on that. There’s a reason that, generally speaking, there is a 
good deal of latitudinarianism in public pronouncements by 
government this way. 
Now to be sure, that isn’t always so. There are, for example, cities 
that have explicit religious symbols on their city seals. There 
certainly are going to be occasional statements by the government 
that are overtly religious. Sometimes you have particular kind of 
religions, especially who are presented in legislative prayers and 
such. 
But to the extent that the political processes allow that, I just don’t 
think that that’s such a horrible thing. I don’t think it’s something 
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that is clearly forbidden by the Constitution, which bans an 
establishment of religion. I think the framers had a pretty good idea 
of what an established religion was. It was a religion that was given 
special institutional discrimination in its favor, for example, with 
rules that only members of this religion could hold office, or with 
specialized block grants given to the religion. 
You could imagine some doctrine under which an official statutory 
pronouncement saying, “X is the official religion of our jurisdiction,” 
might qualify as establishment. But I’d rather not police that line, 
because once you start policing the line then there is the question, 
“What about a Christmas tree?” which, by the way, our family has 
long had and sees nothing religious about, likely because of our 
Russian background. Perhaps your family took the same view. 
What about the names of cities? There was a lawsuit not quite 
about the name of the city but about a city that had three crosses on 
its seal. It was Las Cruces, New Mexico. And the Tenth Circuit 
rightly rejected that. Do people who are in Las Cruces, are they 
reminded by the seal and by the name about the Catholic tradition, 
and about the probably still enduring Catholic, or at least Christian, 
majority there? Sure. But whatever the problems are with that, courts 
trying to police that makes them worse. 
Professor Dorf: I’ll give a thirty-second answer to Ilya’s second 
question. 
Think about a bribery case. Suppose it’s someone, a talented 
individual, a musician said to a politician, “I will play a personal 
concert for you in exchange for your voting for me the way I want 
you to on this bill.” That would be a bribe. I’m pretty sure that would 
be a thing of value under the law. 
So, the problem isn’t the distinction between money and other sort 
of goods and services and so forth. It’s this narrower notion of 
corruption. Now, there are line-drawing problems, but I don’t think 
that’s the one that I would focus on. 
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Professor Volokh: No, but I think— 
Professor Segall: Eugene, hold on. Let’s go to the next question. 
Professor Volokh: Fair enough. 
Professor Segall: Pam, go ahead. 
Professor Pam Karlan: Pam Karlan, Stanford Law School. 
This was a fascinating panel. And one of the things I wondered if 
you both might comment on is a huge change that was occurring in 
society—and I think, Eugene, you kind of almost alluded to this—in 
the backdrop as the Court confronted these First Amendment issues, 
which is over the course of Justice Kennedy’s time on the Court, we 
had rising economic inequality in America, which may be driving 
some of the concern in this, and a rising tension of religious 
fundamentalisms around the world. And it’s against that backdrop 
that they’re deciding these cases, and I just wonder why the Court 
seems so much less able to, in this area, incorporate some 
understanding of the change in the ambient world than in, for 
example, the Fourth Amendment with technology. 
Professor Volokh: So I think that at least Justice Kennedy—but I 
think the others, too—think that they’re dealing with enduring values 
here, and that it doesn’t matter if this is a world with a lot of religious 
fundamentalism or less, or it’s more visible now than before, or it’s a 
different kind than before. I think their sense is that the principles 
apply even when there’s more fundamentalism. Cellphones are 
different; we never had cellphones before, so the question is how do 
we adapt something to a genuinely new technology. 
Likewise, I think with regard to economic inequality, I think it’s 
very much a matter of degree. Certainly complaints about undue 
influence from the rich and powerful have been around for a long 
time. The newspaper barons of old had the ability to control whom 
their newspapers endorsed, and more importantly the coverage in the 
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newspaper, which would give them the opportunity to get this kind of 
implied quid pro quo with legislators. 
So, I think that if you ask the Justices that, they’d say, “To the 
extent there have been changes, they have been changes of degree 
and not really vast changes of degree, and we can’t let our doctrine 
turn on how much of that there is in any particular decade.” 
Professor Dorf: On the point about rising economic inequality, 
presumably that matters a great deal for campaign finance. It also 
might matter for access to other kinds of media for people who don’t 
have means. 
And there, I think this is a bastion of formalism, and it’s driven in 
part by the cloistered nature of the Court. You talked about it on the 
first panel, that the Justices can imagine having their cellphones 
monitored or their GPS on their cars. They have a hard time 
imagining what it’s like not to have Internet access or getting your 
news from a single source and not being a sophisticated customer. 
Now, I’m not sure how that would cash out in terms of actual 
doctrine, but I do think that that is a real problem. They all come 
from the same law schools. They had different experiences before 
that, to some degree. Justice Thomas is sort of unusual in that regard, 
in having actually grown up very poor. But, there is a real problem. 
But I don’t think it’s particular to the First Amendment. 
Professor Segall: Pam, I want to comment on your question. 
Since 1981, constitutional law has been driven by Justices 
Kennedy and O’Connor in every aspect. There are almost no cases 
where one of those two didn’t drive the decision. And in my review 
of their careers, neither one had empathy for the poor. 
Professor Dorf: Justice Kennedy represented indigent defendants 
early in his career. 
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Professor Segall: As a Justice. As a Justice, neither one showed 
empathy for laws and statutes that hurt the poor. Certainly, Justice 
O’Connor felt empathy for women but not for the poor. 
And so I think that’s a legal realist answer to your question. 
They’re the only ones who counted, every case went their way, and 
they didn’t care much about rising inequality. 
Professor Volokh: But it’s not just the poor in the standard criticism 
of campaign finance. It’s not just about the poor not having equal 
access. It’s about the poor and middle class and even upper middle 
class not having equal access. That’s the objection. I think none of 
the Justices, even if they were allowed to under law, would be 
spending tens of thousands of dollars to back somebody’s election 
campaign. 
There are maybe other areas. And actually, I think Pam aptly 
pointed out that when you get the fees for various things and 
regulations that make things more time consuming, more 
burdensome, there they do hit the poor hardest. But that’s not, at least 
that’s not the sensible objection to cases like Buckley v. Valeo. 
Professor Segall: Eric, last question. 
Professor Eric Berger: Eric Berger, University of Nebraska. 
One of the things that I find really difficult in teaching First 
Amendment free speech is there are all these areas of regulation that 
just seem wholly invisible to the First Amendment, things like 
tipping rules and securities law or fraud, copyright, where the 
courts—there are definitely arguments you could make that those 
would all be constitutional under free speech. But, the Court doesn’t 
even go there. It sort of doesn’t treat them as free speech. 
Well, so that’s my question is—after cases like Justice Thomas’s 
majority opinion to Town of Gilbert, Eugene mentioned the Sorrell 
case, the Janus case—do you see the Court maybe wading into that 
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area more and treating some things as being reached by the First 
Amendment that we typically just ducked those questions? 
Professor Volokh: Well, I’m not sure how much of it is ducking. 
The Court had dealt with a First Amendment objection to copyright 
law in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises in 1985. It rejected the 
objection, but not on the grounds, “Oh, this is copyright. There’s no 
free speech issue here.” Rather, it said that copyright law is a 
permissible restriction because it is specifically constitutionally 
authorized in a particular way, and because there’s the safe harbor 
provided by fair use and by the idea/expression doctrine. 
Again, that may be wrong in various ways. Certain parts of the 
decision, I think, definitely are wrong. But, the Court certainly took 
seriously the free speech objections. 
Now, one thing that’s been emerging since around 2006, which is 
shortly after I wrote a law review article criticizing this, is that the 
Court has the notion that certain speech can be restricted when it is 
integral to conduct—especially criminal conduct, but also tortious 
conduct. This has surfaced in a lot of cases. It was mentioned in the 
pregnancy counseling case. It came up in Williams, this solicitation 
of crime case. It’s come up in a bunch of other cases. 
So, the Court does seem to be reviving this doctrine, which was 
actually pioneered by Justice Black in many ways, who said he was a 
free speech absolutist. But the one way he dealt with some things like 
threats and fighting words and such is saying, “Well, they’re closely 
linked to conduct.” 
So, I do think that the Court has been developing that exception. 
And I wrote a follow-up article discussing how the exception can be 
systematized, kind of conceding that they obviously didn’t want to 
see things my way, so at least I’ll try to see things theirs. 
I think that this is going to be an increasingly more important 
doctrine for those kinds of cases. But the Court has paid attention to 
these kinds of things. 
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Professor Segall: Mike, the last word. Quickly. 
Professor Dorf: So there are three principal ways the Court can 
reject a First Amendment claim. 
One is to say it falls into some exception that’s longstanding or 
that they’ve just made up and pretended is longstanding. 
The second is they can apply strict or some other kind of 
heightened scrutiny, and say that the law satisfies it. 
The third is that, as you suggest, they can just ignore it because it 
doesn’t fit their conceptual frame, or worse, get themselves turned 
around. 
Matal v. Tam is a great example of this last move. This was the 
case a couple of years ago in which the practice of the Patent and 
Trademark Office of not granting offensive trademarks was 
challenged as applied to a band of Asian Americans with the name 
The Slants that they were using ironically but that was deemed 
offensive. And the challengers win on grounds that this is content 
discrimination. 
And the reason that’s sort of backwards—I’m not saying it’s 
wrong, but it’s sort of backwards—is of course granting trademark 
protection actually reduces speech. So, they had this idea that you 
can’t have a content-based restriction on speech. This isn’t a 
content-based restriction on speech. This is a content-based exception 
to a restriction on speech. But they are not thinking of it in those 
terms. And I think there’s a whole lot of that, of stuff that’s just not 
on the radar. And sometimes when you raise it and they say, “Hey, 
this falls within some pre-existing doctrinal category.” Maybe 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice—which establishes the exception 
for speech integral to conduct—will end up being that sort of 
doctrine. 
Professor Volokh: I will say that the Matal v. Tam question had 
been talked about as a First Amendment issue for decades. 
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Professor Segall: Thank you very much. Thank you. 
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